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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT-
NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THE
DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE IS NOT
AVAILABLE WHEN AN EMPLOYEE POSES
A THREAT TO HIS OwN HEALTH OR
SAFETY-ECHAZABAL V. CHEVRON
USA, INC., 226 F.3d 1063
(9th CIR. 2000)
Douglas C. Heuvel
HE Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is a "national
mandate" to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disa-
bilities in "critical areas" of life such as employment.' While the
ADA generally prohibits employers from making employment decisions
based on an individual's disability, employers are not prohibited from
making an adverse employment decision when a disabled individual
poses "a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace."'2 In Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether the "direct threat" defense is available to employers
when employees, or prospective employees, "pose a direct threat to their
own health or safety, but not to the health or safety of other persons in
the workplace."'3 The court correctly concluded that the ADA's direct
threat defense is not available to employers in that situation.4 The court
recognized that the language of the statute is unambiguous and "the di-
rect threat defense plainly does not include threats to the disabled indi-
vidual himself."5 In addition to giving a proper reading of the statutory
language, Echazabal is in harmony with congressional intent. Overpro-
tective and paternalistic attitudes toward disabled people are forms of
discrimination in their own right. Had the court allowed employers to
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
2. Id. at § 12113(b).
3. 226 F.3d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000).
4. See id.
5. Id. at 1067.
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protect employees from themselves, it would have been endorsing a form
of discrimination that Congress intended to prohibit when it codified the
ADA.6
In 1992, Mario Echazabal applied to work directly for Chevron in its El
Segundo, California oil refinery. Echazabel had worked in the refinery
since 1972 as an employee of multiple maintenance contractors.7 Chev-
ron extended Echazabal an offer for employment that was contingent on
his passing a pre-employment physical examination given by a Chevron
physician. 8 The results of a test conducted during the examination
showed that Echazabal's liver was releasing enzymes at a higher rate than
normal.9 Fearing that Echazabal's liver would be damaged by exposure
to chemicals used in the refinery, Chevron rescinded its offer of
employment. 10
Echazabal continued to work in the Chevron refinery as an employee
for Irwin Industries, a maintenance contractor, until 1995 when he reap-
plied to work directly for Chevron." Chevron once again made
Echazabal an offer for employment that was contingent on his passing the
physical. Again, the offer was rescinded for fear that Echazabal would
suffer liver damage if he worked in the refinery. 12 After Chevron re-
scinded the offer for employment the second time, it requested that Irwin
no longer use Echazabal in a position at the refinery where he would be
exposed to chemicals and solvents.' 3 Irwin complied with the request,
and Echazabal lost his position at the Chevron Refinery.
Echazabal filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and in state court, alleging that Chevron and Irwin
had violated the ADA by discriminating against him on the basis of his
disability.' 4 The case was removed to federal court, and the United
States District Court for the Central District of California entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of Chevron. 15
The district court certified for appeal its grant of summary judgement,
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994) which lists "overprotective rules and policies"
as forms of discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities.
7. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065.
8. Before asking Echazabal to take the physical examination, Chevron had deter-
mined that Echazabal was otherwise qualified for the job for which he was applying. Id.
9. Id. Echazabal later consulted with a number of physicians and was diagnosed with
asymptomatic chronic active hepatitis. However, none of the physicians that Echazabal
saw concluded that he should discontinue working at the oil refinery. Id.
10. Id. Echazabal had applied to work in the coker unit at the refinery where he
would have been exposed to hydrocarbon liquids and vapors, petroleum, solvents and oils.
Id. at 1065, 1070.
11. Id. at 1065.
12. Id.
13. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065.
14. Additionally, Echazabal claimed that Chevron had violated the Rehabilitation
Act, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, and intentionally interfered with his
employment contract with Irwin. The district court granted Chevron's motion for sum-
mary judgement on these three issues, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judge-
ment on all three claims. Id. at 1065 n.1.
15. The district court denied Irwin's motion for summary judgement. Id, at 1065.
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and Echazabal's appeal was heard by the Ninth Circuit.16 After consider-
ing the "direct threat" defense Chevron offered as its reason for not hir-
ing Echazabal, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgement on Echazabal's ADA claim. 17
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Reinhardt stated that in order
to resolve the dispute concerning the scope of the "direct threat" defense,
the language of the direct threat provision itself must first be consid-
ered.' 8 The court initially needed to determine whether on its face the
provision would permit Chevron to use the direct threat defense as a jus-
tification for not hiring Echazabal. 19
According to the court, the "the plain language of the direct threat
provision is dispositive" and "does not afford a defense on the basis that
the performance of a job would pose a direct threat to an employee's (or
prospective employee's) own health or safety."' 20 The court, in order to
rule out the possibility that a drafting error had been committed in limit-
ing the direct threat defense to situations when the disabled employee is a
threat to others, looked to support its interpretation of the defense provi-
sion by referencing the definitional section of the statute. The ADA de-
fines "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation."'21 The court
concluded that because the direct threat defense only refers to threats to
others throughout the statute, the provision could not be read to include
threats to the disabled individual himself.22
Judge Trott dissented.23 He argued that Chevron was entitled to use
the "direct threat" defense, and that the majority's holding was not in
harmony with other circuits that have addressed the issue or with the
EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA.24 In Moses v. American
Nonwovens, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[ain employer may
fire a disabled employee if the disability renders the employee a 'direct
16. Id. at 1065 n.1.
17. Id. at 1065-70, 1072.
18. Id. at 1066.
19. The pertinent portion of the defenses section of the ADA reads:
(a) In general. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this
Act that an alleged application of qualification standards ... that screen out
or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with
a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable ac-
commodation, as required under this title.
(b) Qualification standards. The term "qualification standards" may include
a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace.
42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1994) (emphasis added).
20. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1070.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
22. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1067.
23. Id. at 1073.
24. Id. at 1073-75. In addition to arguing that the "direct threat" defense was properly
used by Chevron, Judge Trott would have affirmed the district court's holding because, in
his opinion, Echazabal was not "otherwise qualified" for the position at the refinery.
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threat' to his own health or safety."'25 The Eleventh Circuit court did not
discuss how it came to this conclusion, but apparently it found that the
EEOC regulations were controlling, or at least very persuasive.26
The EEOC regulations are clearly at odds with Ninth Circuit's decision
in Echazabal.27 The EEOC defines direct threat as "a significant risk of
substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that
cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. ' 28 The
EEOC's discussion of the direct threat defense eliminates any possibility
that its inclusion of "individual" in its definition was an oversight or unin-
tended. The EEOC states:
An employer is also permitted to require that an individual not pose
a direct threat of harm to his or her own safety or health. If perform-
ing the particular functions of a job would result in a high probability
of substantial harm to the individual, the employer could reject or
discharge the individual unless a reasonable accommodation that
would not cause an undue hardship would avert the harm.29
Echazabal correctly relied on the plain language of the statute and re-
jected the EEOC's contrary interpretation of "direct threat." Not only
was the court's decision correct, it was required by the United States Su-
preme Court which has held that "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. '30 The court's
decision gives proper meaning to the statutory phrase "an individual shall
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others."'31 Had the
EEOC's interpretation been accepted, that phrase and others like it in
the statute would have been rendered entirely meaningless. 32
Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plain language of the
statute was sufficient proof of Congress's intent,33 the court wisely rein-
forced its holding by showing that the legislative history of the ADA sup-
25. 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996). In deciding Echazabal, the Ninth Circuit noted
that its decision was not consistent with the holding of the Eleventh Circuit in Moses and
recognized that other "cases do state, in passing dicta, that the direct threat defense in-
cludes threats to oneself." Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1066 (citing LaChance v. Duffy's Draft
House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir.
1997); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995)).
26. See Moses, 97 F.3d at 447. To support its conclusion that the direct threat defense
is available when a disabled employee is a threat to himself, the court cited to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12113(a), (b) (1994) (which on its face would not seem to support its conclusion), and to
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1999) (which is in harmony with the court's holding).
27. The Ninth Circuit invited the EEOC to file a brief commenting on its regulatory
interpretation of the direct threat defense, but the EEOC declined. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at
1069 n.7.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1999) (emphasis added). Chevron argued that the Ninth
Circuit should defer to the EEOC's definition of direct threat, but the court found the
argument unpersuasive. See Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1069.
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(r) (1999).
30. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1069 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994).
32. See Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111-12 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
33. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1067.
[Vol. 54
CASENOTE
ports the position that the direct threat defense is not available when an
employee is only a threat to himself.34 A statement made by Senator
Kennedy, a co-sponsor of the ADA, makes clear that Congress discussed
and ultimately dismissed the idea that the direct threat defense should be
available when a disabled employee is a threat to his own safety. Senator
Kennedy stated: "It is important, however, that the ADA specifically re-
fers to health and safety threats to others. Under the ADA, employers
may not deny a person an employment opportunity based on paternalistic
concerns regarding the person's health. '' 35 By using legislative history to
bolster its already solid conclusion, the court has set an exceedingly per-
suasive precedent that will be difficult for courts to distinguish when ad-
dressing this issue in the future.
Throughout Echazabal, the court remains focused on letting the unam-
biguous language of the ADA guide its responses to the arguments made
by Chevron. Chevron suggested that the court should ignore legislative
intent because forcing employers to hire or maintain employees who pose
a risk to their own safety would expose employers to costly tort liability.36
Even though this question was not properly before the court and did not
need to be addressed, 37 the court used statutory language to refute Chev-
ron's suggestion and expand the scope of its holding. The court held that
"[t]he extra cost of employing disabled individuals does not in itself pro-
vide an affirmative defense to a discriminatory refusal to hire those indi-
viduals,' 38 and that the ADA requires "employers to accommodate
disabled individuals, even when those accommodations impose additional
costs. "39
While the Ninth Circuit's holding on the scope of the direct threat de-
fense is solidly supported by the language of the statute and the legisla-
tive history of the ADA, it may be possible for employers "to side step
this issue by making personal safety an essential function of the job."'40
The ADA protects from discrimination only a person who is a "qualified
individual" with a disability,41 which is someone who "can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires."'42 Chevron argued on appeal that an essential function of the
34. Id. at 1067-69.
35. Id. at 1067-68 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. S9684-03, at S9697 (1990)).
36. Id. at 1069-70.
37. Id. at 1070. The court stated that "[b]ecause Chevron has not argued that it faces
any costs from tort liability, this question is not properly before us." Id.
38. Id.
39. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1070 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994)). The court
recognized that the statute does not require an employer to absorb additional costs im-
posed by employing a disabled worker if the employer could show that the cost of accom-
modating that employee would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
Id.
40. Employment Discrimination-Disability: Rejection of 'Direct Threat' Defense
Changes ADA Playing Field, Attorneys Assert, 68 U.S.L.W. 2781 (June 27, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Employment Discrimination].
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). In determining what an essential function of a job is,
the statute gives consideration to the "employer's judgement." Id.
2001]
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job Echazabal had applied for was to be able to perform the work "with-
out posing a threat to one's own health or safety. ' 43 The court rejected
Chevron's assertion that this was an essential job function, as Chevron
failed to contend that the risk Echazabal was facing would affect his abil-
ity to perform actual job duties.44 The court stated that even had Chev-
ron argued that the risk would have rendered Echazabal unable to
perform, they would not have accepted such an argument "in this case."'45
However, the court stopped short of saying that such an argument would
never be persuasive.
By giving the appropriate meaning to the language of the ADA, and by
respecting the intentions of Congress, the Ninth Circuit has put employ-
ers on notice that paternalistic attitudes towards disabled workers and job
applicants will not be tolerated. 46 Employers, who in the past have dis-
missed or refused to hire disabled workers who pose a threat to their own
health or safety, will be forced to rethink their employment policies.
Rather than thinking for the employee, employers will have either to de-
fer to the disabled employee's own judgement or work with the employee
to develop an employment relationship that is mutually beneficial. 47
In Echazabal, the Ninth Circuit took great strides towards eradicating a
specific form of discrimination that the ADA was designed to eliminate.
Other courts would be well advised to follow the Ninth Circuit's lead, and
when they do, the purpose of the ADA, "the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities ,' 48 will be closer to being
achieved.
43. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1070.
44. Id. at 1070, 1072.
45. Id. at 1072.
46. See id. at 1072.
47. As one attorney noted, "nothing is stopping an employer from making the worker
aware of the risks presented by a certain position ... the employer may want to make the
individual aware of alternative jobs that pose less of a safety and health risk." Employment
Discrimination, supra note 38, at 2781.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
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